Cloning does not mean creating disposable people and harvesting their organs
http://reason.com/sullum/011802.shtml
January 18, 2002
It seems likely that President Bush's
Council on Bioethics, which held its first meeting on Thursday, will support
a ban on all forms of human cloning. The council's chairman, University
of Chicago bioethicist Leon Kass, argues that a blanket prohibition is
the only way to prevent the use of cloning for reproduction.
Kass has a point: If scientists are
permitted to create human embryos with the same genes as donors, it will
be hard to prevent them from implanting those embryos in surrogate mothers'
uteruses. And once such a pregnancy is achieved, compulsory abortion will
be the only way to enforce a ban on reproductive cloning.
The idea of producing children who
are genetic replicas of living or dead individuals arouses almost universal
repugnance. Kass' argument therefore carries weight with people who might
otherwise be inclined to support the use of cloning for therapeutic purposes.
Therapeutic cloning does not mean
creating disposable people from whom organs can be harvested. Rather, scientists
would use genetic material from patients to create cloned embryos and then
use stem cells from those embryos to produce replacements for damaged organs
or tissue. Because the replacements would be an exact genetic match, the
patients would not have to worry about immune system rejection.
Therapeutic cloning holds tremendous
promise for people suffering from a wide variety of disabling or life-threatening
conditions, including diabetes, arthritis, Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, multiple
sclerosis, cirrhosis, and heart disease. To justify foreclosing the possibility
of prolonging and improving the lives of so many people, a powerful moral
argument is required.
For some, that argument is based
on the premise that a human embryo is a person from the moment of conception.
If so, deliberate destruction of an embryo (which is what happens when
stem cells are harvested) is murder, regardless of the motive. Scientific
research that kills innocent people cannot be justified by the hope of
saving others.
The implications of this argument
extend well beyond therapeutic cloning. It applies with equal force to
any form of embryonic stem cell research, whether or not the embryos are
cloned and whether or not they are created especially for research.
Indeed, it applies to in vitro fertilization,
which involves the creation of many embryos, only some of which are implanted.
Anyone who believes that embryos have a right to life is also bound to
oppose all forms of induced abortion, no matter the stage of pregnancy
or the motive (with the possible exception of abortions aimed at saving
the mother's life).
For those who reject this position,
the main objection to stem cell research with cloned embryos is the one
Kass raises: Once created, a cloned embryo could easily be slipped into
someone's uterus and permitted to develop into a baby.
Given the stakes--the lives of millions
who could benefit from therapeutic cloning--it's important to carefully
consider the reasons why many people consider the birth of a cloned baby
intolerable. It's not enough to rely on an intuition, no matter how widely
shared.
Kass' most compelling argument against
reproductive cloning is that it would frequently produce babies with serious
birth defects. Most scientists agree that, given the current state of technology,
trying to produce a cloned baby now would be reckless. But this objection
will lose its force once the technology improves to the point where birth
defects are no more likely in cloned babies than in babies produced the
usual way.
Other objections focus on what life
would be like for children who knew they were the identical twins of people
born years before them. Wouldn't they be torn between the desire to find
their own identities and the pressure to be just like someone else, whether
a parent, a dead sibling, a famous artist, or a Nobel Prize winner?
There's no denying the potential
for anguish in such situations, but it's not clear that they are fundamentally
different from the dynamics that exist in many families produced through
conventional means. The government does not, and should not, try to prevent
parents from molding their children into copies of themselves, treating
them like replacements for lost loved ones, or pushing them to accomplish
great things.
Such behavior, while it may be worthy
of criticism, is not in the same category as beating or starving one's
children, and the cost of trying to stop it through state intervention
would be unacceptable. The same is true of human cloning.
© Copyright 2002 by Creators
Syndicate Inc
By Jacob Sullum